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Abstract 
 
Port development is challenged not only by growing trade flows, but by institutional 
conditions that are more contextual, exhibiting aspects of both path dependence and 
contingency. This paper analyses the intersection of two clear trends in the evolution of port 
systems, decentralisation of port governance and deconcentration of port traffic. The goal is 
to identify how the institutional setting governing the spatial diversification of container port 
activity has changed as a result of this intersection and whether it is suitable to deal with new 
challenges as they arise. An additional question is whether the new institutional settings 
created by port reform in developing countries are suitable to support the successful 
application of port devolution policies imported from developed countries with different 
political and institutional histories. 
 
Based on four national case studies of port reform in Latin America, the paper discusses how 
the interplay between structure and agency in the reform of port governance has in some 
cases created merely a “new” path dependency. Findings show that short-term gains in 
technical efficiency in individual ports contrast with a long-term loss of power from the 
public to the private sector and the lack of integrated transport and logistics policies 
necessary to support ongoing port development. 
 
Key words: port development, devolution, institutions, competition, port systems, governance 
path dependency  
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1. Introduction 
Ports play a critical role as gateways and facilitators of trade. In the last twenty years, 
ports have undergone an intensive process of evolution trying to adapt to a diachronic, 
evolutionary and volatile economic environment. This evolution is directed by and develops 
within specific institutional contexts and structures. Research on port development has tended 
to focus on describing the symptoms, usually scale or spatial patterns, with less attention 
given to the causes of and drivers for successful port development. The results of analytical 
models of this process vary by region and economic context, particularly in developing 
countries. Beyond global changes in the volume and structure of trade, the market structure, 
strategy and technological development in the maritime container industry, institutional 
structures and frameworks impact on individual port and port system development in 
different ways and at different spatial scales. Given current challenges to port infrastructure 
capacity in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the question emerges as to whether the 
chosen development path and institutional setting created by port reform in the 1990s still 
delivers the right "fit" or if reform might be necessary again.  
Decentralisation of port governance from the national scale is a clear trend across the 
globe, as processes of devolution and privatisation have swept the port sector in the last few 
decades. Likewise, the spatial deconcentration of port traffic from primary to secondary ports 
is another clear trend, as port systems move towards maturity. This paper analyses the 
intersection between these two trends, aiming to identify how the institutional setting 
governing the spatial diversification of container port activity has changed as a result of this 
intersection and whether it is suitable to deal with new challenges as they arise.  
An additional and related question is whether the new institutional settings created by 
port reform in developing countries are suitable to support the successful application of port 
devolution policies imported from developed countries with different political and 
institutional histories. Previous research (Gong et al., 2012) suggested that port devolution 
works in a context of well-developed institutional infrastructure and capacities, such as 
integrated transport policy frameworks, investment strategies and plans, transparent 
disclosure, pricing competition and regulatory policy. Similar strategies of devolution have 
been applied in developing countries through the decentralisation of port governance from 
national ministries to local port authorities and the concessioning of port terminal operation 
to private operators. This paper reflects on whether the expected results (technical efficiency 
improvements leading to increased capacity) from port reform have been sufficient, and 
whether the resulting institutional structures are able to keep pace with new challenges such 
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as the concentration of power in the port industry, deficiencies in hinterland access and the 
spatial diversification of port activity. 
In order to analyse the governance of spatial diversification of container port activity, four 
case studies of LAC countries are examined. The first aspect of the analysis is port 
governance reform, the new scales defined and institutional structures in place. The second 
aspect involves an analysis of container traffic diversification and container port 
development, both inside and outside the new governance regimes. Finally, the two issues are 
brought together to explore how each is influencing the other, and to draw conclusions 
regarding the suitability of the new governance structure to manage deconcentration of 
container traffic as a port system moves through the stages of its evolution. In particular, the 
paper considers the management of reactive and proactive deconcentration and whether the 
new structures produce sufficient agency to achieve the capacity and efficiency increases 
required to support the country’s trade needs. 
 
2. Port system evolution 
Numerous studies on port system development exist, evolving from the traditional spatial 
analyses of port expansion and upgrading of berthing and handling facilities (Bird, 1963; 
Taaffe et al., 1963; Rimmer, 1967; Hoyle, 1968; Hayuth, 1981; Barke, 1986; Van Klink, 
1998) to the more recent focus on port competition through hinterland accessibility, such as 
the concept of port regionalization as one possible pathway in port system evolution 
(Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2005; Monios and Wilmsmeier, 2013). Other influences on port 
system evolution include the competition in the maritime foreland, focusing on intermediate 
transhipment hubs and the structure of maritime services (Sánchez and Wilmsmeier, 2006; 
Rodrigue and Notteboom, 2010), and in particular the role of the concentration of liner 
services (e.g. Frémont and Soppé, 2007; Lee et al., 2008; Wang and Ducruet, 2012). 
Ducruet et al. (2009; p.359) argued that “concentration stems from the path dependency 
of large agglomerations”, while drivers of deconcentration include “new port development, 
carrier selection, global operation strategies, governmental policies, congestion, and lack of 
space at main load centres.” According to Barke (1986) and Hayuth (1981), port system 
concentration will eventually reach its limits and invert, leading to a process of 
deconcentration, a phenomenon discussed by Slack and Wang (2002), Notteboom (2005), 
Frémont and Soppé (2007). Wilmsmeier and Monios (2013) argued that existing theory falls 
short of differentiating between deconcentration that emerges upon failure of a system in a 
reactive manner, deconcentration that materializes from proactive port development 
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strategies, and deconcentration that emerges from new economic and industrial development. 
Thus the drivers of deconcentration processes can be related not only to the port system, but 
also to the transport system (i.e. hinterland infrastructure and carrier strategy) and the 
economic system (e.g. logistics strategies, economic development). 
The rise of secondary ports has already been identified in recent research (e.g. Wang and 
Ng, 2011, in China; Wilmsmeier and Monios, 2013, in the UK; Wilmsmeier et al., 2014, in 
LAC). However, unlike previously dominant ports, the emergence and location of such ports 
has not been explained satisfactorily by natural location advantages, suggesting that such 
developments are driven to a large degree by other factors, such as the planning and 
regulatory regimes in each country. It is recognized that to some extent these factors will be 
unique to each port system; nevertheless, some of these key influences, such as port 
devolution policy, the introduction of the private sector to port operations, the ongoing 
relation between the private operators and the changing regulatory system, have been 
hypothesised to be key factors in any such critique (Wilmsmeier et al., 2014). 
 
3. The role of institutions in port development 
A functioning port infrastructure – more precisely, the services it provides – is essential to 
economic welfare in modern societies. Port infrastructure facilitates trade, integrates transport 
modes and connects producers and consumers in different markets. In short, it is essential for 
the functioning of the economy and for developing welfare. Port infrastructure also forms a 
significant part of a country’s capital stock. As a corollary, in order to maintain or improve 
existing port infrastructure, the public and private sectors need to make considerable 
investments. Given the economic relevance of port infrastructure within a country's logistics 
system, its governance is a critical factor.  
This work therefore focuses on key elements that characterize port infrastructure as part 
of a larger transport system, and deliberately discusses the port infrastructure and governance 
nexus in the context of the port system development and capacity challenge. Governance is 
defined as the institutions, mechanisms and processes through which economic, political and 
administrative authority is exercised. This definition builds on an extensive literature arguing 
that governance has gone beyond government (e.g. Imrie and Raco, 1999; Hooghe & Marks, 
2001), and acknowledges the important roles that private actors and civil society play in 
policy making. Importantly, governance as an analytical concept allows a focus on the 
arrangements that are non-hierarchical, multi-level or network based, and acknowledges the 
high degree of complexity facing modern policy problems. 
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The port system has been characterised as an autopoietic system (Sánchez and 
Wilmsmeier, 2010), meaning that it changes its state with each new input, although it has an 
especially high inertia due to time-lagged investments and long-term strategy replication, thus 
raising the importance of the first mover advantage which means that a delayed action may 
no longer be suitable to the new state of the system. Examples in the context of port system 
evolution include when a new port is developed outside the national planning regime, or 
when globalised international port operators monopolise the trade flows of a country. Both 
examples exert a significant impact on the effectiveness of other actions that may already 
have been initiated but not yet concluded (due to the time-lagged nature of transport 
infrastructure investment). In developing countries, autopoiesis may be particularly 
challenged because, even though the transport system steers and organises itself, the global 
tendencies of the system are defined by its environment and not itself (e.g. globalised port 
operators); therefore, while this imbalance between a local transport system and the 
globalised port system applies to all countries, developing countries tend to have less 
developed institutions to manage potential power imbalances. This recursive relationship lies 
at the heart of the interlinked factors influencing port system evolution.  
Ng and Pallis (2010) showed how port governance is largely determined by local/regional 
institutional characteristics, despite attempts to implement generic governance solutions. 
Notteboom et al. (2013) applied the concept of institutional plasticity (Strambach, 2010) to 
port development, arguing that, while port development is path dependent, a port authority 
can achieve governance reform by a process of adding layers to existing arrangements. In this 
way, the port authority does not break from the existing path of development, but develops 
new capabilities and activities via a process of “institutional stretching”. The key distinction 
is, therefore, that port development is path dependent, heavily constrained by past actions and 
institutional design, but also contingent, in relation to private investment and public planning 
(Notteboom, 2009).  
Jacobs and Notteboom (2011) drew on the economic geography literature to define the 
movement from critical moments to critical junctures, and Wilmsmeier et al. (2014) 
identified the key critical moments in port system evolution in LAC (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Critical moments in port system evolution 
Source: Wilmsmeier et al. (2014) 
 
This paper focuses on the port devolution and port system factors in the figure, in order to 
analyse the intersection of two clear trends in the evolution of port systems, decentralisation 
of port governance and deconcentration of port traffic. This analysis will enable a reflection 
on the interplay between structure and agency in determining to what degree the current 
institutional setting developed on the basis of experiences in developed countries (i.e. port 
devolution and privatisation) is adequate for managing such processes in developing 
countries. 
 
4. Structure and agency in port devolution 
Global trends towards political decentralisation and devolution have been identified in the 
literature (Peck, 2001; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). Devolution, however, is not 
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necessarily an actual transfer of power but can be more of a qualitative restructuring 
(Brenner, 2004), characterised as uneven processes of hollowing out (Rhodes, 1994) and 
filling in (Jones et al., 2004; Goodwin et al., 2005), often resulting in asymmetrical acting 
capacity. 
 MacKinnon et al. (2010) argue that any consideration of the role of actors requires an 
approach that can assess structure and agency, and they note that Jessop (2001) is critical of 
Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory for “assuming that a particular structure is equally 
constraining or enabling for all actors” (p.274). Of particular relevance for this paper, 
MacKinnon et al. (2010) stress “the contingent nature of state strategies, requiring concrete 
research to examine the interaction of structure and agency in particular temporal and spatial 
contexts” (p.274). This process is facilitated by considering the path dependent nature of state 
restructuring. According to Peck (1998; p. 29), “Geographies of governance are made at the 
point of interaction between the unfolding layer of regulatory processes/apparatuses and the 
inherited institutional landscape.” It is this interaction that is the focus of this paper, the new 
geographies of governance created in the port sector at the intersection of an applied process 
of devolution and the legacy of current and previous institutional regimes.  
Moreover, what is under consideration is the autopoietic manner in which each new input 
alters the system and affects the success of future shifts in governance. Interestingly, in 
relation both to the autopoietic nature of port system evolution already discussed and the 
recursive relationship identified between port and shipping line strategies by Monios and 
Wilmsmeier (2015), Jones et al. (2004) identify a recursive relationship between state 
personnel and institutions. MacKinnon et al. (2010; p.275) use the terminology of Duncan 
and Goodwin (1988) to assert that state personnel are both agents and objects of reform: 
“Devolution has not only created new organisational forms, strategies and relations which 
have changed the role of state personnel, it has also been ultimately interpreted and delivered 
through the actions of such personnel.” This viewpoint can be transferred to port actors and 
even port institutions such as port authorities. These institutions have in many ways been 
both the agents and objects of reform, with a high degree of regulatory capture evident in port 
sector actors through their relationships with terminal operators and shipping lines. In their 
implementation of port devolution processes, these actors will be strongly influenced by the 
inherited legacy of their port system, raising the question of the extent to which a “new” path 
dependency is created that might in fact result in adverse effects. The case study analysis in 
this paper will explore to what extent such results are already becoming evident. 
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5. The Latin American and Caribbean port system 
Figure 2 shows all LAC ports with more than 100,000 TEU in 2012. 
 
 
Figure 2. Map showing all LAC ports with throughput over 100,000 TEU in 2012 
Source: authors 
The map reveals what at first appears to be a relatively even spread across the coastlines of 
each country. However, container throughput within each country or coastal range is not 
spread evenly across all ports (see Wilmsmeier et al., 2014 for full analysis). Container 
throughput in the Latin American and Caribbean port system grew from 12.6 million TEU 
(twenty-foot equivalent units) in 1997 to 45.6 million TEU in 2012.  Throughput in 2012 was 
equivalent to 7.2 per cent of all global port movements (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. LAC container throughput by coastal range 1997-2012, TEU 
Source: authors 
In 2012 almost one-fifth of all containers in LAC were moved in Brazil (17.8 per cent), 
followed by Panama (14.8 per cent), Mexico (10.5 per cent), Chile (7.8 per cent) and 
Colombia (7.3 per cent). 
The LAC port system has been shown, overall, to conform to expected trends in port 
system evolution (see Wilmsmeier et al., 2014 for a full analysis). Most ranges demonstrate 
the expected pattern of an early rise of one or two dominant ports, followed by the rise of 
secondary ports which leads to deconcentration. The exceptions are ECCA, NCSA and 
WCCA. NCSA and WCCA are at the earlier stage of development towards an initial 
concentration, still witnessing the dramatic rise of a single dominant port, whereas ECCA is 
the only coastal range not following the expected pattern, as Colón has been able to maintain 
its dominance. This is due, however, not to changes in its own coastal range but primarily to 
taking transhipment traffic from Caribbean ports. 
While the overall volume of container traffic in LAC is small in the global context, its 
spatio-temporal development over the last 15 years emerged from sustained overall economic 
growth and was accompanied by a wave of port reform in the majority of the countries of the 
region, starting in the 1990s. Recently, however, discussions on port infrastructure capacity 
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limitations in LAC have resurfaced (Perrotti and Sánchez, 2011). The following section uses 
four case studies to evaluate the current situation of port infrastructure development and its 
institutional framework with specific focus on the governance of spatial diversification of 
container trade activity and port infrastructure capacity development.  
 
6. Case studies: governance of spatial diversification of container port activity 
6.1 Chile 
6.1.1 Port governance reform 
Until the late 1990s, investment in infrastructure and maintenance of the public ports 
were almost fully undertaken by the national government, under a tool port model. The 
government was in charge of managing the ports, making infrastructure investments and 
planning the national port policies. The Chilean port reform in the late 1990s, based on Law 
19 542, created 10 independent port authorities (Empresas Portuarias) from the national ports 
company (Empresa Portuaria de Chile, Emporchi). These organisations have the mandate to 
control port operation and development while maintaining a sound financial status. A 
regulatory framework was established based on the landlord model, where terminals should 
be operated by the private sector under concession agreements. An important feature of the 
law is that it limits the development of new quay infrastructure to the private sector after a 
public tendering process
1
.  
The intention of the new concession system was to promote effective infra- and 
superstructure investment (e.g. cranes, yard equipment, berths, yards) and to enhance 
management, expertise, commercial capacity and technology in the terminals. A further aim 
was to reduce port costs and to enhance service quality, particularly by reducing waiting and 
service times. 
In general the port reform is viewed as a "a largely successful experience, both because of 
the financial results that public and private companies involved have achieved, and because 
of the quality of the port facilities, services and rates on offer" (Michea, 2014). While this 
finding is true at individual port level, the capacity, strategy and planning pf the port system 
as a whole presents several deficiencies. Particularly, as the reform did not create a national 
ports authority but left the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications (MTT) with a 
central role in the development and management processes of port companies (and in limited 
cases powers to approve or reject specific stages of the independent planning). Furthermore, 
                                                          
1
 The port authority company is only allowed to invest in new infrastructure in the case of failure of the 
tendering process. 
11 
 
the MTT was given the responsibility to propose ‘strategic plans’ for port development, 
without clearly specifying the nature and reach of these plans and strategies.  
However, after the reform the MTT “abandoned its infrastructure planning role in the 
freight sector in general” (Michea, 2014), and completely relied on the decision making of 
the individual port authorities. In consequence, the country today has neither a national port 
system development strategy nor a strategy to integrate the ports within the wider transport 
system.  
 
6.1.2 Container port traffic and port system evolution 
Geographic location plays an important role in the Chilean transport system and therefore 
has a significant impact on its economy. The ports of Valparaiso and San Antonio are the two 
largest Chilean container ports, handling 55% of the country's container volume in 2013, a 
share that has been reducing since 2004, when both ports handled a 69% share. This 
reduction is significant as it occurred in a market that expanded from 1.5 to 3.8 million TEU 
in the same period, indicating a process of geographical deconcentration of port activity. 
Table 1 shows container throughput at Chilean ports. 
 
Table 1. Container port throughput (TEU) in Chile, 1997-2012 
Year 
San 
Antonio Valparaiso 
San 
Vicente Iquique Arica Coronel Lirquen 
Puerto 
Angamos Antofagasta 
Punta 
Arenas 
1997 373,236 271,739 48,212 99,047 71,761 - 61,093 - 41,994 21,054 
1998 415,001 255,687 - 107,903 75,268 369 85,542 - 38,779 21,468 
1999 374,945 278,142 - 90,748 73,927 35 90,679 - 41,904 18,749 
2000 455,604 256,386 - 107,545 65,366 181 65,985 - 48,753 14,342 
2001 413,900 291,403 - 105,250 54,350 295 72,341 - 47,119 12,330 
2002 438,570 300,031 - 111,510 53,966 1,742 103,255 - 41,626 14,784 
2003 524,370 319,368 - 135,267 56,637 3,052 143,454 - 47,266 14,834 
2004 639,762 388,353 - 158,957 61,285 - 140,673 31,000 41,399 15,957 
2005 773,024 377,275 147,968 208,303 57,186 - 171,791 32,000 50,046 18,702 
2006 676,300 614,841 255,566 226,197 68,053 3,767 189,661 49,000 49,966 19,895 
2007 650,697 843,957 492,917 263,251 87,335 1,228 203,578 93,291 72,365 22,118 
2008 687,864 946,921 604,560 334,302 116,720 968 231,397 97,226 76,685 27,008 
2009 729,033 677,432 494,275 207,940 109,572 118,253 206,541 115,486 81,414 22,636 
2010 870,719 878,787 363,557 264,974 130,984 139,474 231,636 129,000 103,795 24,359 
2011 928,432 973,012 425,967 237,758 170,110 170,771 314,956 158,323 88,213 27,836 
2012 1,069,271 942,647 585,280 245,290 182,039 167,682 143,635 134,162 90,232 32,211 
Source: authors, based on UN-ECLAC database
2
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 Excluding some very minor ports. 
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The data reveal the emergence of three new ports (Coronel, San Vicente and Puerto 
Angamos
3
) entering the market in the south and north of the country. All three derive from 
the economic development in their hinterlands, but actually do not compete over the same 
hinterland with the two traditional main ports. Consequently this spatial differentiation of 
port activity stems from a local demand and at the same time does not alleviate the pressure 
on infrastructure capacity in the central region of Chile. The operator of the main container 
terminal in San Antonio is the same as in San Vicente. Thus, while the individual port San 
Antonio was not able to increase its market share within the port system (although it did grow 
in absolute terms), the private operator’s share in port activity and geographical influence 
grew strongly.   
However, for the two major ports Valparaiso and San Antonio, port expansion in the 
existing port footprint has reached its limits and faces additional challenges, as in both cases 
political, natural and geographical barriers limit the development of new terminals or new 
ports nearby. Expansion plans for San Antonio and Valparaiso exist, but in the case of 
Valparaiso the engineering work and impact on the city would be substantial and for a new 
terminal within the city boundaries an economically efficient rail access is impossible to 
construct. Furthermore, in the case of Valparaiso a significant effort has already been put in 
place to extend the lifecycle of the container terminal (Cullinane and Wilmsmeier, 2011) by 
building an inland “dry port” terminal to allow blocks of containers to be pushed to the 
hinterland for processing, thus relieving congestion in the port yard. In the case of San 
Antonio a development plan for an "outer port" has been drawn, but such a project would 
potentially alter the existing competition between the terminals within San Antonio and also 
with Valparaiso, making the discussion a political one in an institutional vacuum given the 
non-existence of a national port infrastructure and logistics development strategy.  
Another main impediment is the nonexistence of naturally-protected bays or sheltered 
waters. The extent of capital expenditure requirements, already high for port infrastructure, is 
exacerbated in both ports by the history of seismic activity, with significant additional 
construction necessary in order to ensure the physical viability of port facilities. Additional 
capital expenditure may also be required in order to comply with environmental standards, 
                                                          
3
 Puerto Angamos started to operate in 2003 and in 2005 the concession was granted to the Ultramar Group. 
One important difference to other ports is that the container activity is only a minor part of the port’s activity 
and it has been able to grow on the backbone of the mining  and economic development in this northern region 
of Chile. 
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with both local communities and regulatory bodies able to exert influence over the port 
industry and both ports being situated close to the city centres.
4
 
The MTT is now attempting to create a National Port Development Plan, but the question 
is how far such a plan can then proactively contribute to a more integrated port system 
development, given the current decentralised structure of governance. The symptoms of the 
failure of institutions can also be seen by the re-emergence of strikes in Chilean ports, where 
the reform left development to the private sector, but did not govern the overall framework 
and conditions of labour. The main reasons for the strikes in 2013 and 2014 were labour 
conditions and salary disputes (46% of all strike days in Latin America in 2013/14 took place 
in Chile).  
6.1.3 Summary of key issues 
New secondary ports in other parts of the country have been developed by private 
operators, and other ports show natural growth which is being accommodated by the existing 
infrastructure. The issue in Chile is a lack of capacity in the centre of the country, where the 
two dominant ports, after initial private investment to increase technical efficiency, have 
again reached capacity limits. There is currently an institutional impasse over who will 
develop a new terminal or port. The re-emergence of labour issues creates further 
uncertainties in the port sector and might be perceived as an additional risk by potential 
investors (ECLAC, 2014). Finally, the need to build new breakwaters in any case poses 
additional challenges as according to existing law these would have to be built by a private 
investor, thus a whole question of governance and agency emerges for this basic 
infrastructure.  
 
6.2 Mexico 
6.2.1 Port governance reform 
Prior to 1993 all ports in Mexico were operated by the single national operator PUMEX 
(Puertos Mexicanos). In 1993 Mexico engaged in an extensive port reform process involving 
the privatization of terminal operations through concession agreements. During the port 
reform 64 API (integrated port administrations) were created. The goal was to deregulate and 
decentralize port administration and planning and to facilitate the privatization of port 
operations and stimulate private investment under the landlord port authority model. APIs are 
commercial public enterprises that manage the ports in which private, municipal and state 
                                                          
4
 Valparaiso’s status in the UNESCO World Heritage list is an important determinant in the development of 
sustainable and low impact port development. For details see: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/959 
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representatives participate. The land managed by the APIs is concessioned from the state. 
The port law delimits the administrative function and the authority to avoid discretional 
interventions (Wilmsmeier, 2006). A final aim was to reduce corruption and monopolies. 
However, the federal government remains the highest level port authority and gives the 
guarantee for concessions.  
An important component of the port reform in Mexico was the influx of global terminal 
operators. Over the last decade HPH has been the most active global port operator in Mexico 
and in 2012 reached a participation in Mexico of just above 50% of container throughput. 
The role of APIs is very significant as the growth in demand is creating the need for further 
capacity expansion. The initial container terminal concessions are currently up for renewal, 
and the result of these negotiations (either to re-concession to old operators or to new ones) 
will have a significant influence on the Mexican container market. 
 
6.2.2 Container port traffic and port system evolution 
Table 2 shows natural growth at the smaller Mexican ports and a significant dominance of 
Manzanillo and Lázaro Cárdenas (both on the Pacific coast), as well as the rise of Veracruz 
and Altamira (on the Gulf coast). In 2004 the container throughput on both coasts was almost 
similar, but by 2012 72% of container throughput was handled through terminals on the 
Pacific coast (Wilmsmeier et al., 2014). The rise in importance of Asia as a trade partner and 
transhipment activity on the Pacific Coast have been the drivers of this imbalance between 
coasts. 
The number of container terminals in the country increased from 7 to 14 between 1994 
and 2002 and to 17 by 2014. So, rather than entirely new ports, the port development has 
been achieved by the development of new terminals within existing ports. This not only 
increases capacity, but raises the possibility of intra-port competition, by concessioning two 
or more terminals within the same port to different operators. 
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Table 2. Container port throughput (TEU) in Mexico, 1997-2012 
Year 
Pacific coast Gulf coast 
Manzanillo 
Lázaro 
Cárdenas Ensenada Progreso Mazatlán 
Pacific 
coast 
share (%) Veracruz Altamira 
Gulf 
coast 
share (%) 
1997 256,405 8,111 14,796 19,753 8,679 38% 364,259 141,902 62% 
1998 276,542 7,167 13,668 28,777 10,433 36% 427,415 162,529 64% 
1999 319,570 4,468 20,744 43,017 15,228 38% 484,523 166,191 62% 
2000 426,717 752 26,822 56,581 16,813 42% 540,014 182,545 58% 
2001 458,472 - 26,016 60,117 18,315 43% 543,327 206,864 57% 
2002 638,597 134 53,142 59,140 12,900 50% 548,422 225,937 50% 
2003 709,209 1,646 46,332 60,369 16,394 50% 571,867 256,417 50% 
2004 830,777 43,445 39,202 68,159 15,954 53% 591,736 297,017 47% 
2005 872,569 132,479 75,101 71,837 17,559 55% 620,858 324,601 45% 
2006 1,249,630 160,696 123,711 75,692 30,111 62% 674,872 342,656 38% 
2007 1,409,614 270,240 120,324 75,584 29,363 63% 729,717 407,657 37% 
2008 1,409,782 524,791 110,423 66,477 27,668 65% 716,046 436,234 35% 
2009 1,110,356 591,467 110,952 53,517 29,322 66% 564,315 400,968 34% 
2010 1,511,378 796,023 135,606 56,434 25,795 69% 662,537 488,013 31% 
2011 1,762,508 953,497 132,727 61,925 22,744 70% 729,622 547,612 30% 
2012 1,992,176 1,242,777 140,468 64,229 39,263 72% 806,047 578,685 28% 
Source: authors, based on UN-ECLAC database
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In terms of specialization of terminals and investment in port terminal equipment, the port 
reform in Mexico can thus be considered to have reached its goal. Container terminal 
development was driven by international terminal operators Hutchison Port Holdings (Lázaro 
Cárdenas, Manzanillo, Ensenada, Veracruz), and SSA (Acapulco, Manzanillo, Veracruz, 
Cozumel, Progreso), and, since 2014, ICTSI (Manzanillo) and APM Terminals (Lázaro 
Cárdenas). 
The concession processes have faced challenges when they considered second terminals 
in existing ports as these concessions ideally produce intra-port competition. By way of 
example, the signing of the contract for TEC II in Lázaro Cárdenas (APMT) to construct the 
new terminal was delayed, because the present operator (HPH) moved for legal action against 
this new competition and the conditions created by the port authority. 
With the new terminals (Lázaro Cardenas, Manzanillo) in general the port system will 
receive an important expansion of port capacity, which will further be enhanced if port 
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development plans at Veracruz on the Gulf coast turn into reality. However, as mentioned, 
future new terminal developments all run the risk of legal action as they will alter existing 
intra-port competition.  
As the government is aware of the lack of transport infrastructure in general and port 
infrastructure in particular the government is implementing a Transport and Communications 
Infrastructure Investment Programme 2013-2018, which is designed to “turn Mexico into a 
global logistics centre of high added value.” The programme plans to spend US$46bn on 
transport infrastructure, while 700 billion pesos (US$55bn) will be spent on 
telecommunications, including on improving internet access. While the idea of the 
programme is valuable, groups like the Asociación Mexicana de Agentes Navieros 
(AMANAC) argue that the investment should be diversified and not principally focus on the 
main container ports, but also on secondary ports (Guaymas, Pichilingue and Ensenada) and 
terminals for other cargo than containers.  
AMANAC also argues that the current port and customs tariffs are not competitive and 
that a reform of tariffs is required by the Secretaría (Ministerio) de Comunicaciones y 
Transportes (SCT) as homologation of tariffs currently reduces competition between ports. 
Furthermore, AMANAC and other agencies continuously point out that investment in ports 
alone is not sufficient but that the accessibility of the hinterland of the port needs to be 
improved. 
 
6.2.3 Summary of key issues 
In terms of port capacity, the Mexican port system is in a good position which can partly 
be attributed to the early reform and the influx of private operators who developed new 
terminals within the existing ports. New terminals continue to be developed so medium-term 
port capacity in Mexico is expected to be sufficient.  
However, the downside of the system is that, while the decentralisation process helped 
local port development and broke the national monopoly, in the current situation one 
international terminal operator dominates half of the country's throughput. This is, however, 
expected to change once the new terminals in Manzanillo and Lázaro Cardenas are fully 
operational. However, the question of competition between terminals and ports will remain 
and the country will have to face these global operators in any future concession process. 
Another issue of growing concern is the hinterland connections of the ports; in some cases 
road and rail access is hindered by poor infrastructure or fragmented operations (Wilmsmeier 
et al., in press) and the overall investment in ports may not suffice in the long term. However, 
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it can be concluded that, at least in comparison to the other cases in this paper, the current 
investment programme and the steering at national level has helped to create a favourable 
environment for port development. It should be expected that the port infrastructure 
development on the Caribbean/Gulf coast will now be able to catch up with the processes on 
the Pacific coast. 
While there are criticisms to the current situation, the current Mexican government seems 
to have taken a more proactive role in promoting investment in infrastructure, but there is a 
need for a more systemic and logistics-driven vision remains as the geography of Mexico 
should allow for a wider level of competition than just between terminals in each port. 
 
6.3 Brazil 
6.3.1 Port governance reform 
In 1990, the Empresa de Portos do Brasil S.A. was dissolved, and in 1993 port law 8630 
was passed, which allowed for the sector's denationalisation with the aim of decentralisation, 
autonomy and flexibility of the port system, a new operating schedule (24 hours), and the 
system was opened to the private sector for the provision of new services and port operations. 
28 Consejos de Autoridad Portuaria (CAP) were created, which facilitated a greater 
participation of the local community in port management, as well as 26 Organos de Gestiao 
de Mano de Obra (OGMOs - entities made up of operators and workers, whose objective is to 
provide labour in every port). A further eight regulatory updates and decree laws related to 
ports were enacted between 1993 and 2011 (cf. Galvão et al., 2013). The Decree Law 6,620 
established strict rules limiting private ports to handling only their own cargo, dis-
incentivizing investment into the sector from private parties.  
Since June 2013, the Decree no. 8033 regulating Law no. 12815 supersedes the Port 
Modernization Law 8,630/93. The Secretariat of Ports (SEP) is to lead an integrated strategy 
aimed at modernizing the public ports administration, while the Brazilian Agency for 
Waterway Transportation (ANTAQ) will be placed in charge of all procedures for port 
bidding. In order to increase competition, the criterion formerly used in tender proceedings 
(highest bid) has been replaced by greatest capability to move tons and lowest cost. 
Therefore, in concession and lease tenders the following criteria will be used separately or in 
combination: (a) greatest capability to move, (b) lowest fees or (c) shortest time to move 
freight. 
These criteria may be combined with other criteria seeking to increase competition, such 
as highest investment amount; lowest consideration payable by the authority providing the 
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concession; or best technical proposal. It also provides that tenders will preferably be in the 
form of open or combined bidding. 
ANTAQ can now allow private terminals to move third party cargo, replacing the former 
concept of private port facilities focused on their own cargo. In addition, private terminals are 
now permitted to compete with public ports. Private use terminals are new port facilities 
located outside the area of an organized port exploited under an authorization given by 
ANTAQ for a period of up to 25 years, extendable for successive periods, provided that the 
port activity is maintained and the authorization holder makes the necessary investments to 
expand and upgrade the port facilities. The Regulating Decree is therefore an important 
guideline for investors interested in developing new projects in this sector. Most of the new 
investments are to develop green field sites outside, but near, established ports. The new law 
also includes automatic renewal of long-standing concessions and fixes the duration of 
concessions at between 20 and 50 years. It also removed the restriction that excluded 
shipping companies from running port terminals in Brazil.  
Another aspect of the new port law is the centralization of intermodal infrastructure 
planning. The laws have created more defined responsibilities between the ministries, 
regulatory agencies and port authorities in hopes of streamlining the intermodal 
transportation network. The private sector is concerned about the bottlenecks in Brazil’s trade 
infrastructure as well as the costs in getting products to the global markets. One of the biggest 
problems facing exporters in Brazil is the country’s reliance on trucks and poor highway 
systems to connect goods to ports. In 2013, a truck gridlock stretched for 31 miles outside of 
Santos, a major port in São Paulo that accounts for 25 percent of all agricultural exports. A 
lack of railway and waterway infrastructure forces companies to rely on a limited number of 
roads to transport goods from farms and mines to the ships at port. 
Dock workers largely back the new law. Yet some port industry players caution that the 
federal government's newfound authority in terminal leasing is already causing more legal 
difficulties. In August 2012 Brazil launched its Logistics Investment Programme which 
includes investment of over US$25 billion in the port sector from private and public sources 
and an additional US$1 billion for improving the ports' accessibility. Terminals at the port of 
Santos as well as ports in Paranaguá are in the first round of bidding.  
 
6.3.2 Container port traffic and port system evolution 
Table 3 reveals a significant concentration at the country’s major port of Santos, with 
some concentration towards other ports. Many minor ports have experienced natural growth 
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due to the overall market increase, while others have taken an increase in market share.  
Traditionally, Santos has been the principal container port in Brazil and 36 per cent of 
Brazil’s container throughput was handled in the terminals of Santos in 2012. However, its 
market decreased in comparison to 1997, when the port was responsible for over 43 per cent 
of Brazil’s container movements. Rio de Janeiro as the second biggest container port in 
Brazil in 1997 lost 50 per cent of its market share over the last 15 years (although it grew in 
absolute terms).  
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Table 3. Container port throughput (TEU) in Brazil, 1997-2012 
Year Santos Paranaguá Navegantes 
Rio 
Grande 
Manaus 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
Suape Itajai 
Itaguai/ 
Sepetiba 
Itapoa Vitória Salvador Pecem 
Sâo 
Francisco 
do Sul 
1997 829,486 139,141 - 194,963 60,738 202,763 30,642 118,822 - - 62,472 52,496 - 95,394 
1998 799,478 161,569 - 224,577 31,078 198,197 48,953 129,563 - - 72,875 51,375 - 116,707 
1999 774,959 194,939 - 261,929 48,553 204,289 39,142 136,062 - - 86,810 79,116 - 151,111 
2000 800,898 252,879 - 316,972 88,807 217,332 62,822 176,815 3,790 - 91,738 95,307 - 168,334 
2001 892,802 281,891 - 346,321 102,448 252,071 75,816 243,554 16,910 - 93,203 106,761 - 176,222 
2002 1,068,606 271,219 - 438,196 128,688 271,589 108,958 334,726 20,065 - 128,451 134,664 - 258,826 
2003 1,385,421 309,924 - 522,980 109,230 325,222 60,721 441,867 27,307 - 143,564 169,092 - 281,057 
2004 1,749,539 378,834 - 572,326 108,167 344,439 133,882 564,012 132,039 - 190,535 191,834 - 275,514 
2005 2,236,580 420,318 - 666,834 75,030 326,177 171,409 642,375 187,402 - 220,761 208,029 - 280,915 
2006 2,445,941 493,787 - 595,802 53,532 335,145 184,428 684,497 259,891 - 249,734 225,682 117,934 260,486 
2007 2,532,900 595,261 12,379 607,275 12,095 387,809 237,077 668,521 229,742 - 267,890 230,270 143,667 316,050 
2008 2,677,839 604,690 216,539 607,177 349,100 424,700 229,700 474,438 282,007 - 272,100 263,722 137,500 277,746 
2009 2,255,862 630,597 398,935 629,586 309,700 350,295 242,765 195,176 206,667 - 209,096 244,204 139,102 190,321 
2010 2,715,568 546,564 424,229 647,188 383,000 315,489 324,191 384,950 125,196 - 243,788 233,736 167,209 113,251 
2011 2,985,922 681,678 581,493 618,039 481,000 415,446 417,666 438,752 183,601 39,544 280,262 242,758 190,656 177,793 
2012 2,961,426 743,830 618,434 611,133 490,000 437,205 393,452 385,193 332,195 270,415 270,408 251,566 149,103 115,868 
Source: authors, based on UN-ECLAC database
6
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The Brazilian port system has undergone significant changes driven by the economic 
development of various regions and states, but also as a response to slow or insufficient 
expansion of port infrastructure in comparison to growing demand. The process of 
deconcentration in Brazil is strongly influenced by port access issues (e.g. limited draft in 
Santos) and port hinterland accessibility (Santos, Rio de Janeiro) as congestion from lack of 
accessibility has generated significant cost increases (e.g. specific surcharges). 
In 2008 APMT assumed management of Ceará Terminal Operator (CTO) the stevedoring 
and container terminal operating company at the Port of Pecém, in Northern Brazil. CTO was 
established as a consortium at Pecém in 2003 with a view toward the region’s vast potential 
of export reefer containers carrying such cargoes as bananas, melons, pineapples, and 
mangos. Overall container throughput for the facility was projected at 100,000 TEU annually, 
but has since then surpassed the measure. In addition, the Portonave terminal was developed 
in the port of Navegantes., with the backing of MSC. Itapoá started operating in 2011 after 18 
years and US$314m in private investment. Thus the port is a good example for the challenges 
to obtain licenses and guarantees from international, federal, state and municipal agencies.  
These proactive private sector terminal developments were outside the regulatory 
framework as the 2007 decree stipulated that private terminals must move mainly their own 
cargo as opposed to third party cargo. Thus the Decree 6620 could be considered to have 
encouraged investment within existing terminals opposed to greenfield development. 
However, it upset members of the Brazilian Association of Ports and Terminals (ABTP) 
because it erected more barriers that impeded much-needed investment in new greenfield 
sites along Brazil’s 8,500 km coastline. 
There is rising demand for additional ports and terminal capacity in states like Pará, home 
of the Amazon River basin. The government plans to auction four groups of public ports to 
private buyers, starting in Santos and Paranaguá, the country’s most utilized ports. Though 
the Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento (Brazilian Development Bank—BNDES) will 
continue to play a large role in financing infrastructure, the Brazilian government hopes to 
gain $7.2 billion in private investment in concessions over the next five years. 
There is hope that the new port law will facilitate terminal development in order to close 
the current gap in port infrastructure (beyond container terminals), as it aims to facilitate 
investment in infrastructure. However, as in the other cases the role of the national 
government in terms of national port system development remains unclear.  
 
6.3.3 Summary of key issues 
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While Brazilian container port development did move down the expected road of 
decentralisation, the new port law aims to recentralises public sector power; however, it does 
not solve the uncertainty existing in current legislation. The new port law now tries to 
stimulate greenfield development, without solving the legislative issues in existing port areas. 
Thus latest developments focus on attracting investment in hardware, but do not solve the 
institutional structure and agency issues. Local port authorities actually are stripped of some 
of the powers that had been devolved to them (Codesp in Santos, APPA in Paranagua, and 
CDRJ in Rio de Janeiro). A modification of the 1993 port law could have worked as well, as 
one of the aims of the new law was also to "legalize" the three greenfield terminals 
(Portonave, Itapoa and Embraport). 
The new port law is facing legal challenges as the government claims that the pre-1993 
tender contracts are now invalid (e.g. Codesp in Santos) and also the SEP is currently 
reluctant to extend the contracts for post-1998 leases, which further contributes to legal 
uncertainty for investors. A further key issue that remains is the number of public agencies, 
beyond SEP and ANTAQ, that are involved in port activities, which lead to significant delays 
and uncertainties, as was seen in the delay of 18 years in the development of Itapoá. 
 
6.4 Argentina 
6.4.1 Port governance reform 
Prior to 1991, the state port authority (AGP) administered the ports, but lacked autonomy 
in decision making to guarantee economically efficient port operations. The port sector 
worked deficiently, struggling from innumerable regulations, unclear responsibilities, 
insufficient and ineffective services at very high prices and problems in the port labour 
sector. The excess of regulation stalled the potential of private investment in the ports. The 
country did not have a national port development framework, which also limited the 
necessary investment.
7
   
Since Argentina was striving towards a more export-oriented economy with growing 
export flows, the National Congress passed a series of laws to push towards an opening of the 
economy in the beginning of the 1990s, driven by various intentions, the process of 
democratisation, and the challenge to recover the deficits of outstanding investments. The 
liberalisation process included the deregulation of certain economic activities and the 
introduction of a convertibility law. Argentina was in fact one of the first South American 
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countries to allow for the privatisation of transport infrastructure at the beginning of the 
1990s. After 1991, several decrees were passed regarding the deregulation of activities in the 
port sector
8
 in order to establish free-market mechanisms for service provision, and to reduce 
tariffs and achieve a higher degree of international competitiveness.
9
 After the reform, the 
port authority organisation in Buenos Aires was supposed to terminate but because of 
indecisiveness, the AGP still continues with its prior characteristics. This unclear situation 
did not send a clear signal of institutional strength to the port industry and shipping lines. 
The port reform was part of a general change in the nation’s economic policy, based on 
private initiative and the operation of key infrastructure components. One of the most 
important aspects of this initiative was labour reform, which eliminated restrictive labour 
practices, promoted stable relations between labour and terminal operators, and reduced the 
number of workers in ports. The goals of the reform were to improve efficiency, productivity 
and investment and hence competitiveness, encourage foreign trade, promote free 
competition and reduce the bureaucratic inefficiency of state-owned enterprises. 
 
6.4.2 Container port traffic and port system evolution 
Table 4 shows that Argentina still only has one major port, Buenos Aires, which handled 
1.7m TEU in 2013, an astonishing five times more than all the rest combined. The next 
closest was Zárate with less than one-tenth of its total. This is an example of extreme 
concentration for a country this large. 
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  Main instruments: Port Law No. 24093 and decrees 1740/91, 2284/91 and 817/92. 
9
 This reform included: (a) Creation of administrative and management agencies for several ports, and the 
transfer of other national ports to the jurisdiction of sub-national government. (b) Liberalisation of contracting 
towing, stowage, etc. services. (c) Free crew selection by ship owners. (d) Free pricing for tariffs and freight. (e) 
Port service provision to be allowed 24 hours a day. (f) Greater legal safety for pre-existing and future private 
ports. In addition, flexible start-up rules were established. 
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Table 4. Container port throughput (TEU) in Argentina, 1997-2012 
Year Buenos Aires Zárate Ushuaia Rosario 
Bahia 
Blanca 
Madryn 
1997 1,023,958 - 26,980 - 703 14,914 
1998 1,139,730 - 29,838 100 1,411 12,304 
1999 1,076,102 - 22,598 355 3,047 12,220 
2000 1,126,712 3721 26,159 444 5,328 n/a 
2001 962,965 17,674 23,539 601 5,059 16,707 
2002 745,658 26,424- 11,600 2,825 6,247 23,071 
2003 897,123 56,089 15,559 8,481 9,591 24,173 
2004 1,138,503 40,370 25,867 20,782 13,275 21,190 
2005 1,255,000 17,025 30,474 18,258 11,217 21,778 
2006 1,567,000 20,497 45,626 19,879 9,162 24,196 
2007 1,709,000 22,903 55,730 26,109 10,314 20,808 
2008 1,781,100 34,794 58,869 42,151 25,523 24,011 
2009 1,412,462 63,920 39,593 39,138 28,558 20,453 
2010 1,730,831 86,814 63,359 50,420 16,565 23,346 
2011 1,851,687 107,928 63,049 49,819 31,196 27,755 
2012 1,656,428 132,831 71,758 29,532 27,340 25,333 
Source: authors, based on UN-ECLAC database
10
 
 
Port operation in Puerto Nuevo, Buenos Aires city, was transferred to the private sector in 
1994. The port was reorganised into six terminals, with separate calls for bids to promote 
intra-port competition. Concessions for terminals 1-5 were granted to globally operating port 
companies. Terminal 6 was closed a few months after the concession had been granted to a 
local group (Sánchez and Sgut, 2002). After these concessions were granted by the national 
government, a new container terminal was built a few miles away and under a different 
jurisdictional system. This terminal has had an outstanding performance record since its 
inauguration in 1996 and today is handling the greatest share of all containers in Buenos 
Aires. By contrast, the terminal in Zárate, while experiencing an important growth over the 
last decade, has never managed to develop into a serious competitor for the existing terminals 
in Buenos Aires.  
A new terminal development is currently underway in La Plata (developed by ICSTI); it 
will add an annual capacity of 450,000 TEU to the Argentinean port system and is expected 
to be fully operational in 2015. However, the inland infrastructure to the new terminal has not 
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been developed as expected by the government and thus the accessibility is somewhat 
restricted.  
A key aspect of the current structure is that administrative agencies have to contribute to 
the transfer and/or privatisation efforts of port services and terminals. These units are still 
located at different jurisdictional levels: national, provincial or municipal. Each organisation 
has different decision-making and financing mechanisms, and this lack of coordination makes 
port access on the land and waterside in Buenos Aires a major issue. Terminals are in central 
urban locations and both rail and highway access must compete with the regular city traffic 
when serving the port. This is particularly a concern for truck traffic, carrying 85 percent of 
the port cargo
11
. Dredging is a critical and expensive task for the ports. However, the access 
channel has not been dredged at the new required drafts, which bears the risk that the port 
may become unable to accommodate direct deep-sea calls. 
Additionally, so far Argentina’s transport policy has not been integrated to national 
economic or trade policies.
12
 The government has never allocated sufficient revenues for the 
development of infrastructure and today lacks sufficient revenues to invest in the necessary 
infrastructure, and maintenance on important parts of the country's transportation 
infrastructure is being deferred.  
 
6.4.3 Summary of key issues 
 Argentina is different from the other three cases in that the port system remains heavily 
concentrated at one port, albeit a port with several terminals. All the others have followed the 
expected port system evolution model of early concentration followed by deconcentration. So 
the problem here is that proactive governance is needed to encourage deconcentration rather 
than stagnation and congestion at one port that threatens the viability of the port sector and 
the country’s trade flows. 
The post-reform structure tends towards decentralisation, and prevents the coordination of 
common port policies and strategies. In the case of Argentina the government strategy to 
drive intra-port competition has created a situation which inhibits the creation of further 
economies of scale and thus has opened a window of opportunity for Montevideo in Uruguay 
to compete with the terminals in Buenos Aires (Wilmsmeier et al., 2011) for transhipment 
cargo to the South of Argentina and to Paraguay. This competition was driven further by the 
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 8 percent is moved by rail and the remaining share by waterborne transport. 
12
 Over the past 10 years, the government's responsibility for transportation has passed through many 
departments within the executive branch. This constant shift appears to have brought about a lack of 
commitment to an integrated transportation system and in a weak position for the Transport Secretary. 
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existing cabotage laws in Argentina. The latest politicised moves by the Argentinean 
government to limit the transhipment of Argentinean cargo in Montevideo (mercopress.com, 
2013) are not supportive to solve the actual issues of lack of scale and dredging in the Buenos 
Aires terminals, and are more likely to challenge the port system rather than improve it. In 
addition, this action suggests that one aim of decentralising port governance (namely, to 
reduce political interference in port operations) has been unsuccessful. 
 
7. Discussion  
Port reform in LAC was driven by a lack of port infrastructure, low productivity, 
technical inefficiency due to low levels of investment in container handling equipment, 
expensive port operations due to monopolized cargo handling, labour issues and absence of 
strategies and planning for long-term infrastructure development. 
Due to the 1990s reforms, responsibilities for both operation and investment were shifted 
from the public to the private sector. The decentralization of port governance to the local 
level and the introduction of concessions for port terminal operations led to a landlord system 
with increasing participation of first international and later global terminal operators 
(Sánchez et al., 2003; Wilmsmeier et al., 2014). A major feature of the reform process in all 
countries was the elimination of state-run public monopolies (Estache et al., 2002), the 
decentralisation of port governance from the national level by the creation of local or regional  
port authorities and the involvement of the private sector to realise delayed investment in 
infra- and superstructure.  
In all cases a new national entity was established, but with some differences, having more 
(Mexico) or less (Argentina) power. In Chile the planning function was left at national level, 
which has not been executed under a systems approach until very recent attempts. In Brazil, 
the latest reforms demonstrate the government attempting to regain control over ports. 
Thus the national governments engaged in a strategy to push responsibilities into different 
spatial scales (local or regional) and to the private sector, based on the principal-agent theory 
under the assumption that this transformation will improve efficiency (Hartley et al. 1991; 
Parker, 1994). Numerous studies have discussed the success of the port reforms in the region 
(Hoffmann, 2001; Kent and Hochstein, 1998; Tongzon and Heng, 2005; Estache et al., 2002) 
by showing evidence of how technical efficiency in the container terminals increased 
(Morales et al., 2013, Wilmsmeier et al., 2013) as well as introducing intra-port competition 
between terminals. Port reform undoubtedly led the terminals in the region to catch up in 
terms of quay productivity, reduced port charges, the attraction of new investment to 
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modernize existing port infrastructure and an overall reduction in labour issues (although still 
with occasional disputes). Table 5 summarises the key findings from the case studies. 
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Table 5. Summary of key findings from the four case studies 
  Chile Mexico Brazil Argentina 
G
o
v
er
n
an
ce
 r
ef
o
rm
 
Year of reform 
 
Late 1990s 1993 1993 1991 
Governance 
reform 
Decentralised from 
national to individual 
PAs 
Decentralised from 
national to individual 
PAs 
 
But federal govt 
remains final guarantor 
of concessions 
Decentralised from 
national to individual 
PAs, but main power 
remains with central 
government 
Decentralised from 
national to individual 
PAs 
Aim of new 
governance 
structure 
 
 
Increase technical 
efficiency and 
incentivise private 
investment 
(achieved) 
 
 
Increase technical 
efficiency and 
incentivise private 
investment (achieved) 
 
Break national 
monopoly and 
corruption (achieved) 
 
Increase technical 
efficiency and 
incentivise private 
investment (partly 
achieved) 
 
Increase technical 
efficiency and 
incentivise private 
investment (achieved) 
 
Responsibility for 
port development 
strategy 
Individual PAs and 
concessionaires. 
 
Individual PAs and 
concessionaires. 
 
Individual PAs and 
concessionaires. 
 
Individual PAs and 
concessionaires. 
 
Recent change in 
responsibility for 
port development 
strategy 
 
Recent attempts to 
develop a national 
strategy. 
Recent attempts to 
develop a national 
strategy. 
Recent new port law to 
promote greenfield 
investment and to 
correct legislative 
errors, as well as 
attempts to develop a 
national strategy. 
None. 
Integrated 
national transport 
policy 
 
No Recent attempts to 
implement one. 
No No 
P
o
rt
 t
ra
ff
ic
 a
n
d
 d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
Container traffic 
trends 
 
Deconcentration to 
new ports (in other 
parts of the country). 
The central part of 
the country remains 
concentrated. 
Deconcentration to new 
ports. And new ones 
developing. 
 
One operator controls 
over 50% of national 
throughput 
Deconcentration due 
both to congestion at 
main port and regional 
economic development 
 
Still concentrated at one 
port. 
New ports? 
 
 
No, but conversion of 
existing terminals in 
the south and north 
No new ports but new 
terminals within 
existing ports, and 
more coming onstream 
soon. 
Yes, but partly “ïllegal" 
under the 2008 decree. 
No. 
Port development 
reactive or 
proactive 
 
 
Two new ports in 
south of the country 
were proactive  
 
In the central part it 
was reactive, due to 
congestion but only 
short-term solutions. 
 
Reactive efforts by 
private operators to 
develop new terminals 
as throughput 
increased. 
Reactive, due to 
congestion and 
limitations at current 
ports. 
 
Neither. Needs proactive 
efforts to encourage 
deconcentration. 
Role of public 
sector in the 
development of 
Concession granting 
and monitoring 
Concession granting 
and monitoring 
Concession granting 
and monitoring, 
 
None. 
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new ports 
Role of private 
sector in the 
development of 
new ports 
 
All done by private 
operators 
All done by private 
operators 
All done by private 
operators, very limited 
public sector spending 
None. 
R
es
u
lt
s 
an
d
 i
ss
u
es
 
Capacity 
 
 
Lack of capacity in 
central Chile where 
two dominant ports 
have reached 
capacity. 
 
Will soon be fine. 
 
 
 
 
Lack of capacity Lack of capacity in 
Buenos Aires. 
Labour issues 
 
Labour strikes. Labour strikes. Strong unions Not known 
Other issues 
 
 
 Majority of throughput 
in the country handled 
by one operator. 
 
Legal insecurity from 
new port law for 
existing lease and 
concession contracts 
Delayed dredging, 
limited accessibility for 
large vessels 
 
The table shows that the main features of decentralisation of governance scale and 
deconcentration of container traffic are common across the cases, but there are some different 
results regarding port development in each country. 
Most of the terminal developments within existing ports can be linked to the influx of 
international port terminal operators in the region (see also Sánchez and Wilmsmeier, 2006). 
In 2006, 33 container terminals were being operated by international terminal operators in 12 
countries of the region. This number increased to 66 by the beginning of 2012. Port reform 
has thus created significant advances at terminal level in terms of technical efficiency, but not 
always at port level. The main deficit is institutional, as none of the reforms managed to close 
the infrastructure gap from the 1990s. The reforms remain at a first level and have not 
managed to transform the new port authorities into institutions with real agency. An 
important focus of the reforms was on creating intra-port competition, many times leaving 
aside issues such as minimum scale efficiency (e.g. Buenos Aires - see Sánchez and 
Wilmsmeier, 2006), interport competition and port functions within a national or subregional 
port system.  
Undoubtedly, differences exist between countries, but it is a common feature that the 
institutional structure and agency has not evolved in parallel to the port system, not even in 
reaction to changes in the environment. There can be no doubt that the institutions in charge 
of ports in the region today are not governing, but merely reacting in a firefighting manner to 
shortages of infrastructure. Institutions did not develop the capacity to adjust their 
governance model to a changing economic and market environment. The life cycle of the 
ports and port system in the region advanced, but not their management. Hinterland 
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connections are another common issue across cases, as a lack of an integrated transport and 
logistics policy means that even after ports and terminals are upgraded, insufficient landside 
infrastructure or fragmentation and bureaucracy in the rail sector lead to congestion, delays 
and increased costs for port users. Such issues are often not part of the port development 
process and are not integrated with other governance regimes such as rail regulation 
(Wilmsmeier et al., in press). 
 
8. Identifying the institutional gap 
The case of Chile exemplifies particularly well the current institutional challenges in the 
region. The need for a new port or new terminal as a greenfield development in Chile has 
been in the public domain for more than a decade; however, the lack of progress on the 
project can be considered a result of the path dependency created by the port reform in the 
1990s. The decentralization process and the absence of national governance have created a 
lock-in that prohibits objective decision-making from a port system perspective. A decision is 
required from the national perspective, particularly as any of these solutions will serve an 
identical hinterland and a parallel development of more than one option would inherently 
lead to an overinvestment in port capacity.  
The Chilean case clearly shows that port reform can be very effective to improve 
technical efficiency within the existing terminal footprint, but the port infrastructure has 
reached capacity limitations once again. Thus it might be argued that the current challenges 
are a result of a failure of agency, which is itself evidence of the failure of the institutional 
reform as regards state personnel (in that they were both the agents and objects of reform - cf. 
Duncan and Goodwin, 1988). 
While institutional structures and settings are somewhat different in each of the LAC 
countries, all share the strategy of devolution and decentralisation, while mostly sharing the 
lack of port infrastructure (except Mexico), absence or non-implementation of national port 
system development plans or an integrated transport and logistics policy. The capacity limit 
and timely provision of port infrastructure was and is one of the main challenges in the 
region. Port reform in the region extended the life cycle of the existing port infrastructure 
through technical efficiency; however, the limits of port capacity are inevitably reached 
again, and now expansion is required outside the existing footprints. The lack of port capacity 
has already created in some cases a geographical shift of activity due to congestion (e.g. 
Santos, Brazil), leading to a reactive deconcentration to secondary locations. Thus, besides 
the emergence of new secondary ports driven by regional economic development, a certain 
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level of growth can also be attributed to negative spillover effects from congestion in other 
ports or the hinterland of those ports (see Wilmsmeier et al., 2014 for full analysis).  
The case study countries are aware of the need and as mentioned Brazil has passed a new 
port law to facilitate investment and Chile has finally engaged in writing a national port 
development plan. Mexico also requires expansion of port capacity, but this process is 
underway, suggesting that the central coordination from SCT has led in the right direction; 
nevertheless, other issues remain regarding the renegotiation of existing concessions relating 
to these expansion plans (e.g. Veracruz). Yet the cases also reveal that the efficacy of these 
national efforts has been hindered by the lack of agency in the institutional settings that has 
developed in the two decades since the initial reforms, suggesting that the temporal element 
and the autopoietic nature of the system is inhibiting new attempts at reform. 
The operation of container terminals is now primarily in the hand of the private sector. 
The institutional structure of private investors has undergone significant changes in the last 
decade and today global and international terminal operators control the greatest share of 
container throughput in the region (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2012). This influx of global 
groups raises a contradiction in the devolution process. The reform aimed to create smaller, 
more active, local or regional entities, but these decentralized entities are facing global 
players when negotiating concession contracts, creating a new incongruence of power. A 
situation now obtains where local, regional and even national institutions in the region lack 
the institutional knowledge to critically reflect, analyse and negotiate the wider impact and 
repercussions when passing the "power" of their ports to these global conglomerates.  
Table 6 identifies the key factors of the old path dependency that the institutional reform 
was intended to address, along with the current new path dependency that has resulted. The 
table reveals that the previous reforms have transformed relationships between the public and 
private sector, but have only solved part of the challenges and it seems as if the reform 
process succeeded merely in alleviating the symptoms for a period of time, but was not able 
to eradicate the causes of the challenges.  
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Table 6. Old and new path dependency in LAC port governance 
Old path dependency New path dependency 
Lack of port infrastructure capacity Lack of port infrastructure capacity 
Lack of hinterland infrastructure Lack of hinterland infrastructure 
Delay of investment Delay of investment 
Labour issues Labour issues 
Lack of long term strategies and planning Lack of long term strategies and planning 
Lack of decentralised institutional capacity  Lack of systems approach to port development 
Lack of national institutional power 
Lack of private sector involvement Incongruence of power between public and 
private sector actors 
Lack of technical efficiency Resolved 
 
The decentralisation process was successful in creating more local input in port development, 
but the steering, governing and coordinating roles of the state at a higher level was generally 
missed, or in some cases was created but not developed. A decentralized structure of port 
governance without a national framework or strategy remains a development of individual 
unarticulated entities where the system is not able to capture economies of either scale, scope 
or density. Thus the mentality of reform has once again been overtaken by reality (lack of 
infrastructure, poor performance).  
Rather than a structural reform in order to improve management and flexibility to respond 
to changes in the industry, a lack of decision making remains evident – it is just that the 
power has shifted to different organisations. Indeed, in many cases, it is the same personnel in 
the same positions, only in superficially different organisations. So institutions have changed 
but governance, particularly the aspect of agency, has not been reformed in any real sense. As 
a result, a question to consider in future research is whether the region is perhaps pending 
reforms once again?  
 
9. Conclusion 
The overall aim of this paper was to use the LAC case to analyse the intersection of two 
clear trends in the evolution of port systems (decentralisation of port governance and 
deconcentration of port traffic), in order to identify how the institutional setting governing the 
spatial diversification of container port activity has changed as a result of this intersection and 
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whether it is suitable to deal with new challenges as they arise. In the 1990s policy makers in 
LAC initiated what was intended to be a virtuous cycle to promote technical efficiency and 
expansion of the container port system. However, the role of political traditions in deciding 
the structure and agency of reformed organisations was neither part of the political discourse 
nor has it been comprehensively assessed since. The case findings show that port reform has 
simply replaced an old path dependency with a new one, involving, critically, a loss of power 
from the public to the private sector. For example, when poor management by a private 
operator leads to congestion or labour strikes that close the port and threaten the national 
economy, government actors have few levers to address the problem. Devolving to the local 
level in hopes of achieving a more active and informed local governance, it rather created 
institutional weakness vis-à-vis global terminal operators. Moreover, the reform failed to 
produce an integrated policy framework. It is open to question whether the short term gains 
of technical efficiency in individual terminals make up for such long term losses of control. 
Some recent attempts to regain national influence have been inhibited by the evolution of the 
institutional setting since the initial reforms, in which the required agency to disrupt the new 
path dependency is lacking. 
It is difficult to capture the complex of institutions, mechanisms and processes 
constituting port governance within a single concept and then determine if a governance 
reform has succeeded or failed in broad terms. Indeed, the critical moments of institutional 
transition may be occurring within different sub-systems such as port functions, port ranges 
and liner networks (cf. Figure 1). Thus, when analysing the role of structure and agency, it is 
important to recall Peck’s (1998) identification of the active constitution of geographies of 
governance. The cases in this paper have explored the interaction between the institutional 
landscape and reform processes, and found a lack of institutional agency implicit in a 
transition of organisational scope from the local to the global level. Using the terminology 
developed by Hall and Jacobs (2010), this situation can be defined as an increase in 
organisational proximity (leading to capture by a key sector) and a reduction of institutional 
proximity (leading to collective action problems in the provision of infrastructure). Such a 
nuanced view of different kinds of proximity can also relate to different kinds of peripherality 
(Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2012) and different kinds of mobility (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 
2015), all concepts with direct application to the geography of port governance. 
An additional question addressed in this paper was whether the new institutional settings 
created by port reform in developing countries are suitable to support the successful 
application of port devolution policies imported from developed countries with different 
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political and institutional histories. Previous analysis (Gong et al., 2012) showed that port 
devolution works in a context of well-developed institutional infrastructure and capacities, 
such as integrated transport policy frameworks, investment strategies and plans, transparent 
disclosure, pricing competition and regulatory policy. These institutional conditions tend to 
be in place in developed countries; in developing countries, and Latin America is no 
exception, the institutional capacity to administer change proactively is limited. This lack of 
institutional capacity becomes even more evident if an existing development path needs to be 
altered as this inevitably requires agency to effect the necessary change of institutional 
structure. 
The final question to be asked as a result of the preceding analysis is whether the current 
institutional framework is able to manage deconcentration proactively. It is difficult to draw 
final conclusions based on a limited sample, but it would appear that the reactive 
deconcentration as a result of port congestion and hinterland access limitations leads only to 
the growth of secondary ports which are not necessarily ideal (e.g. Argentina) and may not in 
fact exist in the right locations (e.g. Chile). What is needed is a proactive port development 
strategy that can identify capacity needs and locations and harness local agency in order to 
make a decision within a national framework, including suitable supporting hinterland 
infrastructure. 
Finally, the limitation of this research is that it is focused on the national level. Case 
studies of individual ports in LAC would be valuable to examine in close detail the 
interaction between different government scales (national, regional, local), interactions 
between the public and private sector and investment and planning strategies in individual 
port locations. The higher-level focus of this paper precluded such close analysis of 
individual institutional design. Several questions raised in the above analysis could therefore 
benefit from close analysis of individual port reform trajectories. It is therefore hoped that the 
findings from this paper regarding lack of national system planning and proactive site 
development can provide the starting point for much-needed disaggregated research in the 
LAC region. 
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